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Does Information Lead to Household Electricity Conservation?
Devon Kristiansen
Advisor: Sarah West
Macalester Economics Department

This paper estimates the effect of information on residential electricity consumption.
Household reading expenditure, education level of the household head, and state “green”
electricity pricing program participation rate represent the probability that a household has
encountered information relating the carbon emission externalities of energy consumption and
human-driven climate change. Reading expenditure has a significant negative effect on
household electricity consumption. Initial increases in educational attainment increase
electricity consumption, but education beyond high school reduces it. The predicted social norm
effect of green pricing participation is insignificant.
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Does Information Lead to Household Electricity Conservation?
I.

Introduction
In the late 1980’s, scientists raised the possibility of human-driven climate change. First

attempts to publicize findings failed to motivate the public, perhaps because an average
worldwide temperature increase of several degrees Celsius did not seem significant to laypeople.
Public interest only grew after Congressional hearings and an Environmental Protection Agency
report made headlines in the New York Times, for example, “The Heat is On: Calculating the
Consequences of a Warmer Earth” from 1988. From then on, media was the most prominent
source of climate change information. Human-driven atmospheric changes truly captivated
public interest during the internationally coordinated effort to solve ozone depletion in the late
1980’s (Weart 2008).
Public concern about climate change has been noticeable enough to prompt public
opinion polls since the 1990’s. Though concern has deviated over time around a relatively
constant mean, the majority of Americans express concern about global warming, a testament to
the effectiveness of the information from scientists broadcast through the media (see Figure 1).
Another significant trend in public opinion polls is the decline in the proportion of respondents
who are uninformed or are unsure about the existence of climate change, which indicates that
awareness has risen, but some individuals choose not to believe the evidence they have
encountered. Yet, according to a Gallup poll in 2008, more than 80 percent of respondents claim
that they have made either minor or major changes in their lifestyle to protect the environment,
of which 10 percent report conserving electricity.
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Figure 1: Gallup Poll Results: How Concerned
are you about Climate Change?
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In addition to conservation behaviors such as reducing vehicle use, conserving electricity
is a common adaptation for households that understand the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions
from electricity generation. Yet not all households prioritize energy conservation. In order to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate consequences of climate change, the effectiveness
of information provision must be understood separately from price mechanisms. My paper
estimates household electricity demand using the Consumer Expenditure Survey of 2005 to
isolate the change in electricity consumption associated with household exposure to climate
change information.
In section two I review the economic literature to construct a strong specification model
for electricity demand, to develop theory based on previous studies about energy conservation,
and the role of information in consumer behavior. I discuss my theory in section three, present
my data and regression results in section four, and conclude with the findings and implications of
my paper in section five.
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II.

Literature Review
Nearly all empirical studies on household demand for electricity are based on the models

of Houthhakker (1951) and Fisher and Kaysen (1962). Houthakker (1951) calculates elasticities
of demand of residential electricity in Great Britain to evaluate the effect of an imposition of
two-part tariffs. His study emphasizes the statistical irrelevance of the average price as the
independent variable, and instead uses marginal prices of kilowatt-hours as the more significant
determinant of electricity consumption.1 The model also includes household income, the price of
a substitute energy good (natural gas), and the ownership of complementary electricity
consuming appliances. The study does not attempt to explain the heterogeneity of appliance
holdings across households, which Dubin and McFadden (1984) later prove problematic because
preferences for electricity use are correlated with appliance choice. Houthakker finds an
elasticity of demand coefficient of -0.89 based on household surveys from 1937-1939. The
demand for electricity in the present might be expected to be more inelastic, as we have become
more dependent on a broader portfolio of electricity-consuming appliances while electricity has
decreased as a portion of total expenditure.
Another foundational paper models the distinctions between long term and short term
elasticity of demand (Fisher and Kaysen 1962). The main difference between the long and short
run is the weaker effect of the substitute energy good price in the short term. Substitution of
natural gas for electricity, while holding household services constant, requires a change in the
appliance portfolio, which only occurs in the long run. My paper draws only from the short run
specification because I use an essentially cross-sectional dataset. A weakness of Fisher and
1

Marginal price is the price of consuming the next kilowatt hour, which differs from average price under declining
or inclining block rates. Due to data constraints, I will not be able to use marginal price in this analysis. At the
time of Houthakker’s study, households typically faced declining rate structures. However, utilities in the US today
typically chare inclining rate structures. According to Houthakker (1951), the omission biases my results towards
from zero because households may be facing a higher marginal price than the average price.
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Kaysen is their use of aggregate electricity consumption as the dependent variable, income per
capita, and appliance portfolio of a community rather than data from individual households, due
to data limitations. Their estimates for price elasticity by state range from 0.14 to -0.94. The
wide range might be explained by their use of aggregate dependent and independent variables.
Through the 1970’s, the energy crisis brought a resurgence of interest in the elasticity of
demand for residential energy consumption to understand the implications of energy price spikes
or electricity rationing. Anderson (1973), Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan (1974), and
Halvorsen (1975) build on the earlier literature. Anderson (1973) acknowledges the weaknesses
in the aggregate model of Fisher and Kaysen (1962) and provides a framework to estimate the
price elasticities of demand in California and then the United States using household data and the
marginal prices of declining rate structures and other factors that vary by state, for example
cooling index days and the percent of “all-electric” homes in the state. The estimated elasticities
using 1969 data range from -0.58 to -0.77, which is an improvement in precision from Fisher and
Kaysen (1962). In addition to the effect of disaggregation, their results might also differ from
Houthakker because of the unobserved differences in preferences between Great Britain and the
US and several decades of technological change. These studies inform my theoretical approach
by supporting the significance of a number of essential control variables, for example heating
and cooling days and the price of an energy alternative.
Dubin and McFadden (1984) reveal an essential error in the existing literature of the time.
They explain a bias in price elasticity of demand estimates without a correction for the
correlation between appliance choice and the error term. The household’s unobserved
preferences determine both the appliance purchase choice and the intensity of electricity use.
For example, a household with strong preferences for cool indoor air is more likely to purchase
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an air conditioner and to use it heavily in the summer months. Dubin and McFadden suggest
three strategies to correct for this error: instrumental variables, a reduced-form method that
enters predicted probabilities of appliance purchase directly in the estimation of electricity
demand, and the conditional expectation correction method. Without sufficient time or
background in these methods, my paper will not control for selectivity bias, but will interpret the
results with skepticism knowing the existence of the distortion.
My paper asks whether or not information about climate change induces households to
voluntarily reduce electricity consumption. Voluntary conservation results from disutility from
each unit of electricity used. Jacobsen et al. (2011) hypothesizes that energy consumption causes
disutility, or reduction of satisfaction through consumption, in conserving households, but
disutility is absent in households whose behavior is unaffected by messages about climate
change. The disutility arises from discomfort and awareness that energy generation produces
greenhouse gases that contribute to human-driven climate change. The household avoids
disutility by voluntarily participating in a minimum buy-in renewable energy offset program
instead of changing the intensity of household energy consumption. This phenomenon is
described as a “private provision of a public good” because while the private cost of purchasing
energy offsets is significant, the marginal social benefit of the behavior change is negligible.
The paper found that participating households, on net, consumed more with the green
electricity program. This result indicates that the cost to the household to buy in to the program
was less than the cost of disutility from perceived household contribution to carbon emissions.
To the household’s utility function, the cost of switching to renewable sources of energy negates
the marginal disutility per kilowatt, and the household consumes according to the market cost of
a kilowatt.
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Kotchen and Moore (2008) investigate a renewable energy offset program with a greentariff mechanism, an additional cost for each unit of electricity, rather than voluntary
contribution at or above the minimum buy-in amount, as studied by Jacobsen et al (2011).
Instead of net increases in electricity consumption, Kotchen and Moore found that households
consumed less, but were unable to determine if it was a price effect or a conservation effect.
Kotchen and Moore’s model and the findings of Jacobsen et al. provide support for the effect of
climate change awareness on electricity consumption through the effect of disutility as an
internalized cost.
Reiss and White (2008) found evidence of voluntary conservation in households as a
result of education campaigns during an energy crisis in California in 2000. The significant
response within a short period after a well-orchestrated public appeal campaign, even during a
period of price caps, suggests that households change their energy intensity behaviors in
response to a change in information in the short run without changes in the appliance portfolio.
Literature on the economics of voluntary contributions to a public goods (or reductions of public
“bads”) can offer support that the results of Reiss and White (2008), Kotchen and Moore (2008),
and Jacobsen et al. (2011) are consistent with rational consumer behavior. Andreoni (1990) and
Andreoni (1995) frame voluntary charitable contributions as a form of impure altruism because
individual utility functions not only consider the tradeoff of private consumption for
contributions to a public good, but because individuals also derive utility from the public good.
My paper instead explains the role of information in changing residential electricity
demand, as seen in Reiss and White (2008). I assume that households have preferences that
cause them to have variable likelihood of exposure to climate change information, and might
respond differently to the same information. Instead of the common approach in the literature, I
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hypothesize that households perceive reductions in electricity usage as preventing contributions
to a public bad rather than voluntary reduction as a contribution to a public good. The disutility
reduces the overall marginal benefit of electricity, and results in electricity conservation.
The use of education and readership as indicators of information exposure is used by
Shimshack et al. (2007) to predict the likelihood that households alter fish consumption in
response to mercury advisories. Shimshack et al. uses education based on the hypothesis in
Grossman (1972) that an individual improves his/her ability to process information with
additional levels of education. Shimshack et al. also assumes that information, if concentrated in
news media, will be accessed at a lower acquisition cost for households who read news sources
regularly. Their findings demonstrate that information presented in the media affects consumer
behavior.
Academic research in psychology suggests that climate change mitigation activities are
motivated by economic incentives, moral obligation, social norms, and information, and
emphasize that non-price mechanisms can have just as significant an impact as taxes or other
economic approaches (Whitmarsh 2009, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). One study in particular
discovered misconceptions about effective climate change mitigation strategies. For instance,
recycling was perceived to be effective and thus was the most frequently reported environmental
action taken by households (Whitmarsh 2009). The study suggested that improved information
could significantly change the impact of intentional environmental behaviors.
Informed by previous studies in electricity estimation, conservation, and information, I
next derive for the effect of information in a representative household’s utility function.
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III.

Theory
In this section, I present a simple model that demonstrates the effect of a change in

information on the utility maximization decision in a household. The model most closely relates
to household electricity conservation models of Kotchen and Moore (2008) and Jacobsen et al.
(2011), but differs specifically because I omit the public good of conservation from the utility
function. I assume that individuals within a household have homogenous preferences, the
purchase choice of a durable is predetermined, and increases in information have a negative
effect on the marginal utility of electricity consumption because the household incurs guilt for
perceived contributions to negative externalities through electricity use and carbon emissions.
The information parameter δ encompasses factual knowledge of electricity generation
externalities and informal social pressures to advertising conservation campaigns, either for
environmental reasons or for energy crises response, such as the one described in Reiss and
White (2008).
Households choose the level of electricity to consume through appliance durables and
derive utility from the household services provided by the electricity consumptive appliances. A
representative household maximizes its utility subject to a budget constraint. Utility is a
function determined by household services h , all other consumer goods x , and the total
disutility associated with the level electricity consumption, E multiplied by the function d(δ) ,
which is the average disutility per kilowatt hour. Household services are determined by the
parameters E, electricity use in kilowatt hours, and by the appliance portfolio they own, D.
Household services are not discounted because they represent consumption within one time
period.
(1)

U = U( h(E, D),Ed(δ), x)
11

Electricity use of the household is determined by:
(2)

E = E(H, D, C, PE, PS, Y)

The endogeniety problem described by Dubin and McFadden (1984) is evident here in
Equation (1), because the purchase decision for D is determined by household characteristics
vector H, which also is a parameter in the demand for electricity, which is described in Equation
(2). The vector H includes characteristics relevant to electricity consumption such as education
level, age, and number of household members, energy efficiency, location, and type of household
structure, and unobservable preferences. Household utility is also affected by a degree of
disutility associated with each unit of electricity. The functional form of d(δ) is uncertain, but it
is reasonable to assume that d(δ) is never positive and




is less than zero. A household

experiences decreases in marginal utility as they internalize information about negative
externalities of electricity consumption, but at a certain threshold of understanding, additional
information’s effect on utility is diminishing. For the purposes of this model, d(δ) is exogenous,
meaning that the household cannot choose the level of information available to them or how
information affects their utility.
Other factors of electricity demand (as seen in equation 2) are climate C, the price of a
kilowatt-hour PE, the price of a substitute for electricity2 PS, and household income Y.
The household’s optimization problem is defined as:
max,

,

Φ = U[ h(E | D), Ed(δ), x] + λ(Y – PE E –Px x)

2

(3)

The literature consistently chooses natural gas prices because natural gas is a close substitute for electricity as an
input for household services. See Houthakker (1951), Fisher and Kaysen (1962), Anderson (1973), Houthakker,
Verleger, and Sheehan (1974), and Halvorsen (1975).
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The budget constraint is income minus the expenditures on electricity and all other goods.
The household utility maximization equation (3) is the utility function subjected to the budget
constraint, and is characterized by the first order conditions (4a), (4b), and (4c).
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The first order condition (4a) for the marginal utility of electricity reveals the effect of a
change in information to the amount of electricity consumed by the household. To explore the
effect of a change in δ, (4a) is rearranged to obtain:
  



 










(5)

The first term in brackets represents the change in utility with respect to a change in
electricity due to the positive impact of electricity use on the level of household services. The
combination of this term with the marginal disutility of electricity, which is the second term in
the brackets, represents the marginal benefit in utils of an additional kilowatt hour, which is then
converted by the inverse of λ , the marginal utility of income, to dollar units. The right-hand
side is the marginal cost in dollars per kilowatt hour. The impact of a change in information
increases the magnitude of the marginal disutility with respect to a change in electricity. When
there is an increase in information (and d(δ) becomes a larger negative value), the marginal
benefits decrease relative to the marginal cost at the original level of consumption. The
household must compensate by reducing the level of electricity consumption to maximize utility.
Though the simple model assumes a representative household, in a more accurate model,
each household responds differently to the same level of information. For example, many
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American households are skeptical of the existence of negative externalities from fossil fuel
consumption (which is the dominant source of generated electricity). Thus, this model assumes
the information parameter is internalized. A household with both d(δ) and




equal to zero

indicates that they have no information or do not internalize information so they do not
experience disutility as a result of electricity consumption.
IV.

Data
a. Ideal Data
To test this paper’s hypothesis, the ideal data would be drawn from a survey of household

electricity consumption that includes a quantifiable measurement for a household’s exposure to
messages about climate changes (which could take the form of current event reading or
frequency of watching news coverage on TV) as well as a measurement of the degree to which
the household internalizes these messages. For example, this observation would indicate
whether the individual is consciously aware of externalities as they utilize household appliances.
This measure would ideally combine the extent of accurate knowledge of carbon dioxide
emissions and the emotional effect on utility, and the values would be gathered over time and
across households to isolate changing prices and changing awareness. In addition these
explanatory variables, the survey would include time spent at home, income, education, house
characteristics (as they apply to the energy efficiency of the home), average temperature for the
month, location of the household, number of appliances owned and the efficiency ratings of each,
and the full range of demographic factors, such as number of individuals of the household.
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In addition to a measure of environmental consciousness, I would need an indicator of
energy intensity preferences to correct selectivity bias of appliances, as well as a way to control
for education's role in selectivity bias.
b. Actual Data
Unfortunately, the ideal data is not fully available. Instead, this paper uses the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX), a survey performed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to document
trends in American consumption patterns. The 2005 CEX, which includes data for five
consecutive quarters beginning with the first quarter of 2005, interviewed households about their
expenditures for the current month and the previous three months, as well as a number of
household characteristics, including education of household head, income, family structure,
housing tenure, appliance holdings, and other data. Information about households was collected
although there are no measures beyond square footage, the year the house was built, and number
of rooms to describe the household characteristics of energy efficiency. In the case that the
household uses air conditioning in the summer months and the insulation is poor, the electric bill
will be significantly higher than a household that exhibits the same behavior of using air
conditioning in a more efficiently constructed home. More importantly, there is no direct survey
question to measure the awareness of climate change.
The five quarters were separate data sets, so they have been appended together so that
each household for each quarter appears as a new observation. In the regression analysis, I
cluster by household to correct standard errors for correlations in within household electricity
consumption across quarters.
I derive kilowatt hours of electricity consumed per quarter from the CEX electricity
expenditure data by matching a rolling average by quarter of monthly prices per kilowatt hour by
15

state according to the month that the household was interviewed. I obtain the price data from the
Energy Information Administration. Dividing the expenditure by the rolling average provides a
rough estimate for the number of kilowatt hours consumed. Electricity expenditure is not a
satisfactory dependent variable because of wide variations in average price by state. For instance,
two households facing different prices may have the same expenditure, but consume
significantly different levels of electricity. The price of a substitute energy good, natural gas,
was also taken from the Energy Information Administration and matched to the month that the
household was interviewed by rolling average. I gather heating and cooling degree day data by
state to control for fluctuations in weather from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. I match these data to each observation by quarter and by state. Lastly, I obtain
the 2005 count of participants in voluntary green pricing programs from the Energy Information
Administration, and I derive green pricing participation rates by dividing the number of
participants by the state population found from the US Census.
I use reading material expenditure as a proxy for exposure to and awareness of messages
about climate change, following the example of Shimshack (2007). If a household has been
presented with information about climate change through formal education or from reading
published media, the utility maximization decision will occur at a lower level of electricity
consumption for a comparable household with less information. Because of education increases
information processing, the household head education level is controlled for in the model. Thus,
the null hypothesis is that education and readership have no impact on household electricity
consumption, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that these two factors will be estimated with
negative coefficients. A third proxy for information is the percent of the population who
voluntary participate in green pricing programs through their electric utility. I match the
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participation rate to each household according to state. Green pricing participation is an
indication of households making a discrete decision to voluntarily face a higher price to reduce
electricity use. The motivation for which might be assumed to be for environmental concerns
because of the intentional name “green pricing program”. A higher participation rate within a
state increases the likelihood that a household in the sample is affected by a social norm pressure
to conserve as described by Hunt and Allcott (2010). Social norms facilitate behavior change
because individuals believe that crowds have better information about the benefits of a particular
action.
Interaction terms between reading and education levels should return negative
coefficients increasing in magnitude with higher levels of education because a greater potential
for processing information will amplify the responsiveness of an individual to information about
climate change.
I include a series of household characteristics to control for variation in electricity
consumption not related to my variables of interest. Dummy variables for region capture
unobserved differences in the social norms of electricity usage common to neighboring groups of
states. Tenure is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the household owns the
residence and is equal to zero when they rent or reside without payment. Whether a household
owns the home, whether it is through a mortgage or not, is expected to have a negative impact on
electricity consumption because householders would have more incentive to invest in insulation
or other electricity saving methods as opposed to renters. I include dummy variables for the
population of the household’s city because access to substitute energy goods differs between
rural and urban locations (Labandeira et al. 2005). For this sample, I include five indicator

17

dummy variables for the population size of the city where the household is located.3 Urban
households also may be more likely to use electricity less intensively compared to rural dwellers
because of non-random differences in residence structure, income, education, or appliance
portfolio.
Number of family members and number of rooms are expected to have a positive effect
on electricity consumption. It is also important to include a term for the number of rooms
squared. The squared term for rooms captures increasing costs to heat or cool an additional
room until the ratio of outside surface area to volume decreases to the point of decreasing
marginal cost for each additional room. Age is also supplemented by a squared term to describe
the trajectory of appliance accumulation with age, and then a decrease in use intensity as children
leave and household heads age. I expect a generational component to climate change awareness.
Messages about human-driven climate change have been met with much skepticism in older
people while generally accepted more readily by the younger generation, so there might be a
positive linear trend between electricity consumption and age. I also included the age of the
building to proxy for energy efficiency, expecting that newer homes would be more energy
efficient
c. Summary Statistics
To assess the basic characteristics of my sample before the estimation model, below I
present summary statistics (Table 1). Out of the total 54633 observations in the dataset, 29729
are usable. I exclude households that reported negative total expenditures, in addition to
households that reported zero expenditure on electricity for the time period because their
3

The categorical variable designed by the CEX includes an indicator for households in cities with the following
ranges of population size: More than 4 million, 1.20-4 million, 0.33-1.19 million, 125-329.9 thousand, and less than
125,000.
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response to price and disutility are unobservable and irrelevant to the hypothesis. Also, between
four thousand and five thousand observations do not report the household’s state. One model
also tests the robustness of the results when excluding all states to which observations were recoded. In this sample, kilowatt hours consumed has a large standard deviation. For example, the
most consumption by one household was 38,249 kilowatt hours, compared to the least, or 5.98
kilowatt hours. The large variation provides an opportunity to explain variation in consumption
patterns in conjunction with other information reported by the consumer unit.
The sample represents a varied composition of households according to the categorical
variable of household head’s education level (see the dummy variable means for education levels
in Table 1). The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports of educational attainment from the year 2005
lend credibility to the representative distribution of the sample compared to the national
distribution of education.
However, the sample is biased towards urban households. The US Census defines urban
areas as cities with more than 50,000 residents, and that 80 percent of the United States
population lived in an urban area in the decade between 2000 and 2010. However, more than 90
percent of my sample lives in cities greater than 100,000, so my sample over-represents
households in urban areas.
Total reported expenditure was used rather than the household’s income because
expenditure better represents the household’s budget constraint. A considerable number of
observations in the complete dataset report zero or negative income and still have positive
expenditures in reading materials, in electricity, and overall. Presumably the contradiction
occurs for individuals receiving welfare, using savings or some source of income not reported in
the Survey. Slesnick (2001) argues that income is a less than ideal measure of household
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consumption and welfare, especially in the short run. For a narrow time period, households may
appear to have vastly different standards of living if income is the indicator, but they might have
comparable levels of consumption if they are merely at different stages in the life cycle and
smoothing consumption.
In summary, a full analysis controlling for the crucial variables such as household
demographics and characteristics, education, and total expenditure will return a negative
coefficient for electricity consumption for the variable of readership expenditure and possibly for
education.
V.

Results
a.

Estimation Equation

The predictions of the theoretical model are tested by an empirical equation that explains
variation in electricity consumption by reading expenditure. Reading expenditure, controlling
for education level, increases the likelihood that a household is exposed to information about the
externalities of electricity production. Education could indicate a greater sensitivity to climate
change information because higher levels of education would improve an individual’s ability to
process information, and result in a greater degree of internalization of climate change messages
in the media (Shimshack 2007, Grossman 1972). A third explanatory variable, the percentage of
the state population who voluntarily participates in green electricity pricing programs, is an
indication of the social norms within a state with regard to conservation. The resulting ordinary
least squares estimation specification is Equation 6.
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ln(kilowatt hours) = β0 + β1ln(kilowatt hour price) + β2 ln(total expenditure) + β3
ln(natural gas price) + β4 ln(reading expenditure) + β5 E(vector of education variables) + β6
heating degree days + β7 cooling degree days + β8 housing tenure + β9 age of building + β10
number of rooms + β11 number of rooms squared + β12 family size + β13 age of household head
+ β14 age squared + β15 vector of community size indicators + β16 vector of region indicators +
β17 vector of electric appliance indicators + β18 ε

(6)

Several models are presented to assess the relevance of a number of potential factors for
residential electricity consumption that must be controlled for to isolate the predicted effect of
the three main explanatory variables. I estimate a log-log relationship between the dependent
variable (kilowatt hours) and the independent variables (electricity price, total expenditure, price
of natural gas, and reading expenditure).4
b. Regression Results and Discussion
My first model uses the basic specification equation to estimate the effect of reading
expenditure on kilowatt hours, controlling for education level of the household head. Model 2
includes interaction terms between each level of education dummy variable and reading, plus and
interaction term between reading and household head age. I add green pricing participation rate
to proxy social norm effects of conservation in my third model. In the last two models, 4 and 5, I
introduce a change in specification by incorporating state and quarter fixed effects instead of
heating and cooling degree days and also a model that drops any state that has been re-coded or a
state to which re-coded states have been assigned.5 I remove temperature days and regions from

4

I performed a Box-Cox regression for each of the variables, and the log likelihood coefficient theta is significant to
the 0.001 level for each.
5
The recorded value for state is recoded for some households for privacy reasons. All states that were re-coded
from or to are dropped in Model 5 to eliminate any possibility of incorrect matching of kilowatt hour or natural gas
prices.
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Models 4 and 5 because, by definition, these two variables are perfectly correlated with the state
dummy variables and would otherwise be redundant. State-fixed effects capture state-specific
unobservable cultural preferences for electricity use that are omitted in the first three models.
In each of the five models I regress while clustering for the same household, rather than
using each reported quarter as a separate observation, to account for correlation across
observations of the same household. The entire dataset has 17,244 households, but my usable
subsample includes 9,520 households and 29,729 total observations.
Each of the control variables discussed above were consistently significant and of the
expected sign, with the exception of tenure. The estimate for tenure was positive, which
indicated that homeowners tend to consume more electricity than renters. A potential
explanation could be that the predicted effect of a homeowner’s financial incentive to invest in
energy efficiency was overwhelmed by the tendency for owned residences having more rooms
than rented apartments.6 The sign of the coefficient for the age of the building was inconsistent
between positive and negative and never significant. Perhaps the state of repair, rather than the
age of the house, better determines the energy efficiency.
The population size indicator variables exhibit a pattern in which households in cities of
more than 4 million or 0.33-1.19 million on average consume 3 percent fewer kilowatt hours
than the reference population size indicator (below 125 thousand).7 A simple multi-collinearity
test showed a tendency for households in cities of than 4 million or 0.33-1.19 million to be less
likely to own their home and more likely to have fewer rooms. However, the population size
indicators all have weak, if any, significance.

6

According to a multicollinearity test of the sample.
The calculation for all semi-log percentage estimates is given by ! " #$%/'  1 where c is the estimated
coefficient and V is the estimated variance of c (Kennedy 1981, Anderson and West 2006).
7
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Models without state fixed effects are estimated with indicators for region and heating
and cooling degree days. While the Northeast is insignificant, potentially because of the wide
variation in household characteristics across a densely populated region, while the positive
coefficient on South is highly significant, presumably because of the social norm of intensely
using air conditioning in hot summers. The coefficient on South suggests that, on average,
Southern households consume 40 percent more electricity than Western households, which is the
reference region, controlling for all other variables in the model.
Across the first three models, the price elasticity of demand is -0.40 or -0.41, which is
within the range for short term residential demand found by Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan
(1974), but slightly more inelastic than the short run estimates Fisher and Kaysen (1962), who
include fewer household control variables, for instance, the number of rooms. My model
explains variation in household electricity use more precisely with the addition of household
variables, and reveals that price elasticity of demand for electricity is even more inelastic than
the early literature’s estimation. After controlling for selection bias, Dubin and McFadden (1984)
estimate that price elasticity of residential demand for electricity is within a range of -0.197 to 0.310, depending on the household appliance portfolio and type of selection bias correction,
which is even more inelastic than my estimation. The addition of state fixed effects changes the
price elasticity to -0.37, and the last model estimated price elasticity to be -0.78. If the number
of recoded observations were significant, the dropping of all recoded states might have
eliminated incorrectly matched prices and the model could be estimating a coefficient closer to
the true value. Because of the need to drop heating and cooling degree days because they
correspond directly to state dummy variables, I still control for general seasonality of electricity
use by introducing quarter fixed effects.
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The cross price elasticity of the substitute across the models ranges between 0.11 and
0.41, becoming more responsive with state fixed effects and state drops, like the own price
elasticity. The relative inelasticity reflects the imperfect substitutability of natural gas and
electricity in the short run, for example, the capital cost of replacing an electric heating system
for a natural gas system, or the problem of access for some households. The income elasticity
(0.21 - 0.23) is positive and very inelastic, which indicates that electricity is a normal good and a
necessity.
Model 1 estimates the effect of all controls and the main explanatory variable log of
reading materials expenditure. The significant but small coefficient on the log of reading
materials expenditure can be interpreted as the percentage change of electricity consumption
with a one percent increase in reading expenditure. Thus, Model 1 suggests that an increase in
reading expenditure by one percent would cause a household to change some electricity
consumption behavior to reduce kilowatt hours by 0.6 percent, and the relationship significant at
the 0.05 level.
The direct negative effect of reading expenditure on electricity consumption is
diminished in magnitude and significance by the addition of interaction terms or state fixed
effects, but Models 2 and 3 still estimate a negative coefficient for log of reading. With state
recoding drops, responsiveness of electricity use to reading expenditure is 1.1 percent with an
increase in reading material expenditure by one percent, which is the greatest estimates response
in all models. Again, if the elimination of incorrect state matches is significant and brings
coefficient estimates closer to the true value, Model 5 supports my alternative hypothesis the
most.
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Though only the some high school and high school completion education dummy
variables are significant at the 0.05 level in Models 1 through 4, a pattern of declining average
electricity consumption relative to the reference level (no formal schooling and no high school)
emerges. An increase in income with higher education levels, and therefore an increase in the
appliance portfolio, might explain the greater average consumption of all households except
graduate degree holders compared to the reference level.
In the second model, all but one of the interaction terms between reading expenditure and
education levels are negative, which supports my prediction that education increases an
individual’s ability to process information, though none are significant. A negative coefficient
for this interaction indicates that an increased education level has an additional negative effect on
kilowatt hours consumed associated with reading expenditure. An additional one percent
increase in reading expenditure for high school or college graduates are associated with a 2.5 or
1.8 percent decrease kilowatt hours, respectively. The coefficient on the interaction term for
advanced degree is positive, insignificant, and is smaller in magnitude than high school and
undergraduate. Perhaps advanced degree holders have less sensitivity to additional information
if information has a diminishing effect on disutility.
In all models, kilowatt hours increases slightly with the age of the household head, but I
added an age squared term to capture a lifecycle trajectory, where energy use peaks mid-life
because of a larger family, and decreases as activity in the house tapers off with age. The
interaction term between reading and age could differentiate individuals of an older generation
who are frequent readers from the rest of their more conservative peers in terms of conservation
internalization. However, the coefficient is positive, which would indicate that older readers
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consume less than 0.1 percent more electricity with each one percent increase in reading material
expenditure. This result, however, is statistically zero.
The third model introduces the green pricing participation variable, which has an
unexpected positive coefficient and is also insignificant.8 The coefficient can be interpreted as
the average change in electricity consumption in households in response to an increase in one
percent green pricing participation in the same state. Preliminary analyses found it to be strongly
significant and negative before the clustering of observations by household, so the inflated
significance must have originated with strong correlations within households across quarters, and
the addition of the age of the building changed its sign. The result could be a similar response to
the increase in net electricity consumption observed by Jacobsen et al. (2011).
Across all models, the own price elasticity, income elasticity, and effect of increased
percent of reading expenditure maintained the same magnitude and significance. The results
strongly support a negative effect of reading expenditure on electricity consumption, and weakly
support a decline in electricity use as education level of the household head rises. However, I
cannot conclude that green pricing participation rate by state has a significant correlation with
electricity use among households of that state. A particularly interesting result that interactions
between reading material expenditure and education levels are increasingly negative as education
rose because higher levels of education, as Grossman (1972) hypothesized, increase an
individual’s ability to process information, so the sensitivity to climate change messages would
increase in addition to greater likelihood of encountering information about the greenhouse gas
effect.
Though the results of my study do support my hypothesis that information induces
households to conserve, the magnitude of this effect is still dwarfed by price responsiveness.
8

An F-test found the contribution of green pricing participation to the model to be meaningless.
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Take for example the average household that spends $332 per quarter on electricity, and $52 on
reading materials. If the household increased their expenditure of reading materials by one
dollar, they would decrease their kilowatt hour use by 0.4, whereas if the same amount of
electricity cost one dollar more, they would conserve 4.4 kilowatt hours. Though the average
household response to price is 10 times the response to reading expenditure of the same dollar
amount, compared to the average electricity consumption use per quarter of 3590 kilowatt hours,
neither option seems likely to change behavior greatly. For policy concerns, price
responsiveness might be more effective, unless more targeted and abundant information could
increase the likelihood of behavior change.
VI.

Caveats
The significance of reading material expenditure as an explanatory variable for electricity

consumption seems to support the theoretical framework of this paper. However, this conclusion
must be considered in light of a number of caveats in the case that the variable is significant
through a different mechanism than through disutility from knowledge of negative externalities
of electricity consumption. As stated previously, the measure of income is quarterly
consumption, not annual income. The Consumer Expenditure Survey does not specify what kind
of published reading material is reported, so there is no guarantee that the household purchases
media that presents current events, that the household members encounter news stories about
climate change, or that the household members even pay attention to media coverage of climate
change.
Furthermore, exposure also does not necessarily lead to behavior change. Awareness
may only lead to willful ignorance as has been the case in the United States because of how
politically polarized the issue of climate change has become (Weart 2008).
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A major limitation of my specification model is that I do not correct for selectivity bias.
Ordinary least squared analysis is biased in this case because the error term is effectively a
function of appliance choice. The household preferences that precipitate a particular electronic
appliance purchase are also likely to dictate a higher intensity of electricity use through that
appliance, for example, a room air conditioner. I identify a number of endogeniety problems
here. Appliance choice can be determined by unobservable preferences, income, education, and
information. I include dummy variables for type of heating and water heating systems as a rough
correction.
Appliance selectivity bias may also occur when an individual is more likely to estimate
paybacks from more efficient appliances, for example, if they have a higher level of
education. Household income can also affect electric appliance decisions because households
with greater income may be able to spend more for appliances that last longer or are more energy
efficient.
VII.

Conclusions

In this paper I estimate the effect of three explanatory variables that would support the
hypothesis that disutility occurs in households that have internalized information about the
connection between electricity consumption externalities and human-driven climate change. A
household’s reading materials expenditure, which represents the probability that a household
would encounter news media about climate change, has a consistently negative effect on
household kilowatt hour consumption. Increases in education level, though not all indicator
variables were significant, tend to be associated with an initial increase in electricity
consumption with respect to the reference level of no formal schooling. Compared to the
reference level of no high school education, average electricity use drops as education rises.
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Additional educational attainment represents an increase in an individual’s ability to process, and
can also represent unobservable preferences of an individual to seek information. Interaction
terms with education level and reading suggest that individuals are increasingly sensitive to
information with higher levels of education, but diminishing effects of information appear at the
graduate degree level. Lastly, “green” electricity pricing program participation rates per capita
among states, which would indicate a social norm pressure to reduce electricity consumption,
was insignificant.
My theoretical framework is supported at least by the significance of the reading
expenditure variable, which proxies the level of information available to the household, and the
negative effects of education on average household electricity use. My results suggest that
households perceive the negative externalities electricity consumption as a contribution to a
public “bad”, and derive disutility from electricity consumption. A good associated with a
perceived public good or bad is different from goods that carry potential private costs because
individuals can’t accurate measure, and therefore usually overestimate, their contribution to the
public good or bad.
However, the results of my model imply that price changes still have the greater negative
effect on electricity consumption behavior than information. If the goal is to reduce residential
energy consumption, an increase in price change will be effective, but the incidence will be
highly regressive because the income elasticity is near zero. However, in cases such as the
California energy crisis in 2001, as analyzed by Reiss and White (2008), education campaigns do
have an effect if the information is available and targeted.
These results are subject to several limitations. Though the proxy coefficients identified
for this analysis were the expected sign according to theory and significant, the connection is
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tenuous. An increase in expenditure in reading materials is no guarantee that the household will
encounter or internalize messages promoting carbon neutrality. The negative coefficient on both
main explanatory variables may be the cause of unobserved effects of education or readership.
Education may cause an individual to value substitute goods to household services provided, or
to budget more consciously to save money on electricity. Though the estimation of education
dummy variables indicates that the household electricity consumption generally decreases with
higher levels of education, the percentage change in kilowatt hour for each level of education is
negligible realistically though the model’s coefficient is significant.
A final limitation is that my analysis does not correct for selectivity bias as described by
Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Train (1986). Ordinary least squares attributes variation in the
sample caused by household preferences to the coefficient of price. Without Dubin and
McFadden’s correction, appliance choice selectivity bias may have caused the price elasticity
estimates to be greater in magnitude than the true coefficient. The approach within my capability
to correct this error would be to use a two-stage approach. I would first estimate the probability
of a household choosing electric water heating, space heating, or other appliances using the
instrumental variable of when the house was built. Though this variable is imperfect because the
age of a residence will be negatively correlated with its energy efficiency, the era the house was
constructed might be a high predictor of whether the prevailing heating technology or
availability was natural gas or electric. Train (1986) elaborates on similar selectivity bias found
in the use of automobiles.
Future research for this topic would need to correct for selectivity bias by using
instrumental exogenous variables to predict the choice of electric central heating and electric
water heating. Potential instrumental variables could include the capital cost of electric or

30

natural gas systems or the year the residence was built. Further analysis could also identify a
more fitting explanatory variable to accurately describe the pervasiveness of energy conservation
by state, or could use a different household-level data set specific to electricity use and habits
closely related to environmental awareness such as recycling. Also, this analysis could be
replicated using additional years of the CEX to create an opportunity to follow variation in the
diffusion of carbon neutrality messages in popular media over time. An exogenous variable of
charitable contributions may also be a helpful factor to indicate households that may experience
disutility from knowledge of externalities that do not directly inflict a cost. Lastly, interaction
terms between population size indicator variables and the explanatory variables might be able to
find a relationship supporting the pressures of social norms on household energy use.
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IX.

Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Kilowatt Hours

29729

3592.83

2527.71

5.98

38249.04

29729

9.68

2.54

5.86

22.54

Price of Natural Gas ($ per ft x 10 )

29729

14.13

4.07

5.08

33.07

Total Expenditure ($)

29729

14498.92

12443.76

82.45

266148.90

Reading Expenditure ($)

29729

52.85

144.04

0

8193

No High School (%)

29729

0.03

0.17

-

-

Some High School (%)

29729

0.06

0.25

-

-

High School (%)

29729

0.21

0.41

-

-

Price per Kilowatt (cents)
3

3

College Degree (%)

29729

0.54

0.50

-

-

Graduate Degree (%)

29729

0.16

0.36

-

-

Green Pricing Participants

29729

29217.47

61998.14

0

360398

Green Pricing Participation Rate

29729

0.003

0.006

0

0.03

Age of Building (years)

29729

37.54

29.91

1

286

Age of Household Head

29729

53.03

16.01

16

86

Cooling Degree Days

29729

340.22

435.16

0

1876

Heating Degree Days

29729

997.05

1002.39

0

4024

Family Size

29729

2.58

1.43

1

12

Northeast (%)

29729

0.15

0.36

-

-

Midwest (%)

29729

0.22

0.42

-

-

South (%)

29729

0.36

0.48

-

-

West (%)

29729

0.27

0.44

-

-

Population > 4 million (%)

29729

0.31

0.46

-

-

Population 1.20-4 million (%)

29729

0.27

0.44

-

-

Population 0.33-1.19 million (%)

29729

0.18

0.39

-

-

Population 125-329.9 thousand (%)

29729

0.16

0.36

-

-

Population < 125 thousand (%)

29729

0.08

0.28

-

-

Tenure (%)

29729

0.25

0.43

-

-

Electric Heating (%)

29729

0.32

0.47

-

-

Electric Water Heating (%)

29729

0.86

0.35

-

-

Number of Rooms

29729

6.62

2.17

1

25
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Table 3: Regression Results
Variable

1

2

3

4C

5CR

Log of Price

Some High School*Read

-0.41**
(-9.62)
0.23**
(16.31)
0.12**
(4.68)
-0.006*
(-1.99)
0.10*
(2.25)
0.08*
(2.14)
0.01
(0.34)
-0.04
(-0.97)
-

-0.41**
(-9.6)
0.23
(16.31)
0.13**
(4.68)
-0.006*
(-1.99)
0.10*
(2.25)
0.08*
(2.14)
0.01
(0.34)
-0.04
(-0.97)
-

-0.37**
(-2.66)
0.23**
(17.29)
0.13**
(5.91)
-0.003
(-1.04)
0.11*
(2.11)
0.08*
(2.11)
0.02
(0.48)
-0.04
(-0.95)
-

-0.78**
(-4.66)
0.21**
(11.75)
0.41**
(6.23)
-0.01*
(-2.51)
-0.0007
(-0.01)
0.02
(0.33)
-0.04
(-0.69)
-0.09
(-1.44)
-

High School Grad*Read

-

-

-

-

College*Read

-

-

-

-

Graduate School*Read

-

-

-

-

Green Pricing

-

-0.40**
(-9.6)
0.23**
(16.35)
0.11**
(4.65)
-0.001
(-0.03)
0.10*
(2.14)
0.25*
(2.35)
0.02
(0.52)
-0.10
(-1.87)
-0.005
(-0.22)
-0.01
(-0.74)
-0.008
(-0.41)
0.01
(0.56)
-

0.28
(0.22)
0.02**
(6.73)
-0.0001**
(-5.52)
-

-

-

0.02**
(6.79)
-0.0001**
(-5.59)
-

0.02**
(5.38)
-0.02**
(-4.67)
-

-

-

-

-

0.09**
(17.29)
-

0.09**
(12.74)
-

-

-

-

-

-0.04
(-1.16)
0.02
(0.43)
-0.02
(-0.57)
0.04
(0.99)
0.18**
(7.83)
0.22**
(10.66)
0.20**
(8.89)
0.11**
(7.31)
-0.003**
(-3.38)
6 x 10-6
(0.03)
-0.34
(-1.07)

-0.0002
(0.00)
0.07
(1.30)
-0.005
(-0.08)
0.08
(1.23)
0.20**
(4.99)
0.22**
(6.98)
0.18**
(6.18)
0.11**
(6.14)
-0.003**
(-3.03)
-0.0002
(-0.58)
0.68
(1.71)

Log of Total Expenditure
Log of Natural Gas Price
Log of Reading Exp.
Some High School
High School Grad
College
Graduate School

Age
Age Squared
Age * Read
Cooling Degree Days
Heating Degree Days
Family Size
Northeast
Midwest
South
City Size 1
City Size 2
City Size 3
City Size 4
Electric Heating
Electric Water Heating
Tenure
Number of Rooms
Rooms Squared
Age of Building
Constant

0.02**
(6.73)
-0.0001**
(-5.52)
4 x 10-5*
(2.43)
2 x 10-5**
(2.98)
0.09**
(17.27)
-0.002
(-0.08)
0.14**
(5.44)
0.35**
(15.86)
-0.03
(-0.96)
0.02
(0.92)
-0.03
(-0.97)
0.03
(1.23)
0.19**
(8.59)
0.18**
(8.65)
0.19**
(8.74)
0.12**
(7.77)
-0.004**
(-3.87)
6 x 10-5
(0.28)
0.02
(0.12)

0.02**
(6.71)
-0.0001**
(-5.71)
0.0004
(1.86)
4 x 10-5*
(2.42)
2 x 10-5**
(2.91)
0.09**
(17.29)
-0.0002
(-0.01)
0.14**
(5.58)
0.35**
(16.06)
-0.03
(-0.99)
0.02
(0.92)
-0.03
(-0.95)
0.03
(1.21)
0.18
(9.38)
0.19**
(8.53)
0.20**
(8.80)
0.12**
(7.88)
-0.004**
(-3.95)
6 x 10-5
(0.25)
-0.07
(-0.38)

4 x 10-5*
(2.44)
2 x 10-5**
(2.95)
0.09**
(17.28)
-0.002
(-0.05)
0.14**
(5.45)
0.35**
(15.83)
-0.03
(-0.93)
0.02
(0.89)
-0.03
(-0.96)
0.03
(1.25)
0.19**
(8.55)
0.18**
(8.6)
0.19**
(8.74)
0.12**
(7.77)
-0.004**
(-3.87)
6 x 10-5
(0.28)
0.02
(0.10)

Observations

29729

29729

29729

29729

29729

Adjusted R2

0.3971

0.3979

0.3971

0.4217

0.4195

The dependent variable is log kilowatt hours for the quarter.
In parentheses are t-values.
The omitted categories are no high school, region West, and City Size 5.
* less than 0.05 p-value.
** less than 0.01 p-value.
C
Model controls for fixed effects by state and quarter, coefficients not listed.
R
Model drops recoded state data points.
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